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•	 In	 2017	 Anton	 Alikhanov,	 a	 Moscow	 designate,	 formally	 confirmed	 his	
political	mandate	to	hold	the	position	of	 the	governor	of	 the	Kaliningrad	











region	 remains	weak	 and	divided.	However,	many	grassroots	 social	 ini-










































expansion	 of	 ports,	 the	 airport	 and	 ferry	 links).	 Those	 projects,	 which	
mainly	benefited	people	from	President	Putin’s	inner	circle,	increased	the	
region’s	self-sufficiency	and	in	this	way	made	 it	even	more	 isolated.	This	


















cial	 services	have	stepped	up	 their	defensive	and	offensive	activities	 in	
this	region	whose	location	Moscow	regards	as	strategic.	Defensive	activi-
ties	have	been	focused	on	preventing	a	further	loosening	of	the	oblast’s	































1. expanding military infrastructures (including the expansion of the 
military airfield and upgrades of nuclear weapons depots), 
2. increasing the presence of military personnel (including the re-activa-
tion of a tank regiment and a fighter aviation division),
3. further technological upgrades (including the permanent deployment of 
the Iskander missile systems, expansion of the coastal defence Bastion 
missile systems, deployment of additional fighter aircraft, helicopters, 
tanks and warships), and 
4. increased training activities (including drills with offensive scenarios). 































































































































































































































(OSW)	considers	monitoring	 the	political,	 social,	economic,	energy,	 security	
and	military	situation	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	to	be	one	of	the	priority	areas	
of	its	analytic	work.	
In	 recent	 years	 OSW	 has	 published	 two	 major	 studies	 on	 the	 Kaliningrad	
Oblast:	 in	2012	 it	published:	A captive island: Kaliningrad between Moscow and 
the EU	as	part	of	the	“OSW	Studies”	series,	and	in	2016	it	followed	up	with	the	
report	Kaliningrad Oblast 2016. The society, economy and army.	Because	 impor-
















































Interesting facts about Kaliningrad 
The Polish poet Jan Kochanowski (1530–1584) visited the Albertus Univer-
sity of Königsberg (Albertus-Universität Königsberg) in the years 1551–1552 
and 1555–1556. 
The first book in Lithuanian – The Catechism (Katekizmo paprasti žodžiai), au-
thored by Martynas Mažvydas, was published in Königsberg in January 1547.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who was born and 
lived in Königsberg, swore allegiance to the Empress Elisabeth of Russia af-
ter the Russian army seized the city in 1758 in the course of the Seven Years’ 
War. When the province was restored to Prussia four years later, Kant did 
not want to retract his oath and formally remained a Russian subject till 
the end of his life. 
The Königsberg castle is where the original Amber Room was last seen.
Between April 1945 (capture by the Red Army) and July 1946, Kalinin-
grad bore the Russian version of its previous German name: Königsberg 
(Кёнигсберг). In April 1946 the Königsberg Oblast of the RSFSR was created 
(renamed as the Kaliningrad Oblast in July 1946). 
Mikhail Kalinin, after whom the oblast’s capital was named in 1946, never 
visited the city of Kaliningrad or the region. As the president of the So-
viet Union’s Supreme Soviet (1938–1946), Kalinin was co-responsible for 
mass crimes – his signature can be found on hundreds of execution lists 
including the Katyn execution list. In the years 1931–1990, the city of Tver 
was named Kalinin. Tver is the capital of the Tver Oblast where in 1940 the 
NKVD murdered 6,300 Polish prisoners of war who were subsequently 























The Kaliningrad Oblast accounts for 90% of global amber reserves. Accord-
ing to folk medicine, amber beads worn around the neck prevent a sore 
throat and headaches while also keeping the thyroid healthy. The largest 
known lump of amber kept at Kaliningrad’s Amber Museum weighs four 
kilograms. Also on display at the Museum is an amber mosaic titled Rus, 
which weighs more than 70 kg. 























I. POlITIcAl ANd SOcIAl SITuATION ANd 
INTerNAl POlIcy 











On 10 September 2017, Anton Alikhanov, who had been acting as the re-
gion’s chief since 6 October 2016, was elected as the governor of the Ka-







Anton Alikhanov, the governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast, was born in 1986 
in Sukhumi (Abkhazian ASSR). He is a lawyer and holds a PhD in economics. 
He comes from a wealthy family. His father Andrey was one of the founders 
of Rosmyasomoltorg, a large food processing company in which he holds 
20% of the shares. Andrey Alikhanov is friends with Igor Shuvalov – the 
former deputy prime minister of Russia, current chairman of State Devel-
opment Corporation VB.RF, and Mikhail Babich – the former president’s 
plenipotentiary in the Volga Federal District and current deputy minister 
of economic development. 
In 2010 Anton Alikhanov started working at the Ministry of Justice, and in 
2013 – at the Ministry of Industry and Trade where he served as the direc-























other posts). On 22 September 2015 he was appointed deputy prime minis-
ter of the Kaliningrad Oblast (in charge of agriculture and industry). Less 
than a year later, on 30 July 2016, he was promoted to the function of acting 
prime minister of the region, a position that was restored especially for him 
by the then newly appointed acting governor Yevgeny Zinichev (during the 
term of the previous governor Nikolai Tsukanov, the regional government 
was headed by the governor). On 6 October 2016, President Vladimir Putin 
entrusted Alikhanov with the function of acting governor of the Kalinin-
grad region (at the same time, the traditional model in which the head of 
the region heads the regional government was reinstated). Alikhanov be-
came the youngest regional governor in recent Russian history.
In the gubernatorial elections on 10 September 2017, Alikhanov had no real 
competitors, and the campaign proceeded without any problems, thanks to 
the traditional use of the so-called administrative resource (administra-
tive control over the campaign and voting), cooperation on the part of the 
‘licensed opposition’, and the weakness of the actual opposition in the re-
gion. Apart from him, only technical candidates competed, including Igor 
Revin, a Communist member of the regional parliament, Yevgeny Mishin, 
a regional MP representing the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and 
Yekaterina Timofeyeva of the marginal Russian Green Ecological Party. 
Alikhanov officially won 81% of the vote – a record-breaking victory in the 
history of the Kaliningrad Oblast (his predecessor Tsukanov won 70.4% in 
2015 with a similar turnout of slightly over 39%). Alikhanov’s official result 
of 76.24% was the lowest, though still very high, in the region’s capital city 
of Kaliningrad. According to Golos, the independent organisation which 
monitors the elections in Russia, violations of procedures during the count-
ing of votes in the Kaliningrad region were ‘massive’ and ‘catastrophic’.1
From the start, Alikhanov’s role in the Kaliningrad Oblast has been to mod-



































interests in the region, represented primarily by Alikhanov and the se-
curity institutions, are – as in the case of other regions of Russia – often 
contrary to the interests of local elites, especially when it comes to defin-
ing the region’s budget or controlling regional assets, including proceeds 
from corruption.
In the years 2017–2018 the balance of power in the Kaliningrad Oblast’s 
regional elite changed, mainly as a result of: 
1. the dismissal of Nikolai Tsukanov, the former governor of the Kalinin-
grad Oblast, from his position as the Russian president’s plenipotentiary in 
the North-western Federal District (NWFD), as a result of which he lost his 
sway over the Kaliningrad elite and the situation in the oblast; 
2. the dismissal of Kaliningrad Mayor Alexander yaroshuk (who in the 
past has competed for influence with successive governors including Anton 
Alikhanov);
3. to	a	lesser	extent	–	the dismissals of the heads of several municipal dis-
tricts in the oblast, who held their functions before Alikhanov’s term began. 












































Alikhanov’s	position	was	 further	strengthened	by	 the	dismissal of the Ka-




















of	the	regional	authorities.	Unlike	Yaroshuk,	the new mayor Alexei Silanov 




visibly	weakened	and regional governance has become more centralised 
as municipal authorities were stripped of some of their powers,	e.g.	 in	
































As he stepped up control of the regional elite, Alikhanov has nonetheless 


























































Presidential elections in March 2018
Vladimir Putin’s official result in the Kaliningrad Oblast was almost identi-
cal to the Russian average (76.35% compared to 76.69% across the country) 
and much better than in 2012 when he won only 52.55% of the vote in the 
oblast (the second-worst result after Moscow where he won 47.72% of the 
vote) against the significantly higher national average (63.6%). The turn-
out in 2018 was slightly lower in the Kaliningrad Oblast than in the whole 








Alikhanov in governor rankings
In the Governors’ Influence Ranking, prepared in January 2019 by the 
Kremlin-based Political and Economic Communication Agency APEK, 
Alikhanov ranked 15th among the 85 governors. According to the Minchen-
ko Consulting expert group’s ranking announced in September 2018, al-
though Alikhanov’s position has weakened, he still ranks high (second) 


























(10th in the Russia-wide ranking), gaining seven out of ten points in the “Pu-
tin’s support” category, four out of five points in the “major project man-
agement” category and two out of three points in the “quality of political 
management” category. The ranking points out that there is a growing in-
tra-regional conflict, which may indicate that the regional elite is becom-
ing increasingly dissatisfied with Alikhanov. According to the Medialogia 
agency, which monitors and analyses media and social networks, in 2018 
Alikhanov’s position significantly deteriorated in comparison to other gov-
ernors (from 13th to 23rd position) and he did not make it to the top-20 re-
gional heads most frequently mentioned in social networks. This is partly 
because he has been less active in the media than in 2017, the year of the 
gubernatorial elections in the Kaliningrad Oblast.3
It is unclear whether and to what extent corruption practices in the re-











tion	laws.	However,	there	are	many	indications	that pre-existing corruption 
schemes are merely being centralised and taken over by newly appointed 






































from	the	municipal	authorities	 to	 the	regional	authorities.	 In	 June	2018,	 the	
regional	parliament	adopted	a	law	on	the	matter.
According	to	independent	media	reports,	during	Alikhanov’s	term	of	office	the 
transparency of the decision-making process has been gradually erod-








2. Political opposition and repression
The political opposition in the region is weak and divided, just as it is in 
Russia generally.	Representative government structures are dominated by 





The activities of the ‘licensed’ parliamentary opposition, such	 as	 Gen-
nady	 Zyuganov’s	 Communist	 Party	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	 or	 Vladimir	
Zhirinovsky’s	Liberal	Democratic	Party	of	Russia,	serve the interests of the 
































foreign	 agents	 and	a	 local	 ‘fifth	 column’	 –	 in	 line	with	 the	political	 strategy	
adopted	at	the	federal	level.
Despite the region’s specific geopolitical situation and the special ser-
vices’ ‘besieged fortress’ narrative, the level of repression in the Kalinin-




the	situation	 in	 the	region)	and	 in	order	 to	reduce	 the	scale	of	repression	to	
what	is	deemed	necessary	–	for	image	reasons	and	for	fear	of	an	uncontrolled	
increase	in	social	discontent	in	the	region.	This	is	probably	explained	by	the	
fact	that	the authorities prefer to be cautious: they do not wish to exces-
sively antagonise the local population,	which	has	proven	 itself	 capable	of	














































inal case brought against the fringe nationalist-monarchist organisation 
BARS (Baltic Vanguard of the Russian Resistance).	In	recent	years,	the	or-
ganisation	has	vexed	the	authorities,	including	in	connection	with	its	criticism	
of	the	war	launched	by	Russia	in	Ukraine.	However,	it	in	no	way	posed	a	politi-









The	BARS	case	is	part	of	the secret services’ and law enforcement agencies’ 
fight against alleged extremism,	which	has	been	noticeably	stepped	up	 in	
recent	years	(but	which	generally	serves	mainly	to	boost	crime	detection	sta-
tistics	and	stifle	freedom	of	speech).	This	case	has	also	been	used	in	the	‘anti-







In February 2019 Kaliningrad saw Russia’s first administrative case ini-
tiated under the law on punishment for the participation of minors in 




3. Public sentiments and social activity
Social	moods	in	the	region	are	to	a	large	extent	conditioned	by	the	social	and	
economic	situation	and	problems	occurring	 in	this	sphere. The standard of 



































The raising of the retirement age in 2018 was the biggest factor in spurring 

















































Alikhanov	won	81%	of	the	vote.	The governor is not supported by the region-
al intellectual elites,	who	accuse	him	of	misunderstanding	the	specificity	of	
the	region,	but the majority of the inhabitants seem to passively accept his 















They	organise	pickets,	blockades	of	 trees	 scheduled	 to	be	 felled,	 social	 cam-
paigns	to	clean	up	the	coastline,	etc.	Many	initiatives	are	created	and	devel-







social	 art.	 Kaliningrad	 activists	 are	 inspired	 by	 the	 Polish	 social	 campaign	







































The World Cup 2018, which	included	some	matches	held	in	Kaliningrad, was 
an opportunity to open the region up to the world and intensify people-








4. regional identity and the so-called Germanisation problem
The social and historical identity of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad 
Oblast remains complex, but it includes a strong identification with the 
















































the positive and negative aspects of the region’s location were distributed 




References to the region’s pre-war history may not be dominant in the re-
gional identity but they form an important part of it.	When	describing	the	
region’s	capital	city,	the	inhabitants	chose	phrases	such	as	‘a	city	with	a	histo-
ry’	(11%)	or	‘little	Europe’	(9%),	and	some	even	said	‘Russian	Europe’	or	‘Russian	
Germany’.	Most	 respondents	 (53%)	 unequivocally	 considered	 the	 Protestant	
cathedral	where	Immanuel	Kant	 is	buried	to	be	the	most	 important	historic	
monument	of	Kaliningrad.	The residents of Kaliningrad did not share the 
concerns, sometimes raised by the government, about the increased cul-









This persistent sense the oblast’s residents have of being distinct has been 
influencing Moscow’s perception of the political and economic situation 
in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Because of its geopolitical importance, the re-























including in the field of historical policy. There is no unanimity among 
the decision-makers involved on the detailed content of this policy. 
The alleged ‘Germanisation’ and the need to counter it (i.e.	the	memory	of	
the	German	heritage	 in	every	dimension) are permanent topics in the re-
gional public debate about identity and history,	artificially	stoked	by	the	
‘patriotic	 communities’	 gathered	 around	 several	 pro-Kremlin	media	 outlets	
with	limited	reach	in	the	region	(including	the	Regnum	agency),	and	promoted	
and	exploited	by	the	army	and	the	special	services.	At the official level there 
is a clear tendency to obliterate or ignore the German heritage	(perhaps	
with	the	exception	of	Immanuel	Kant	and	his	legacy),	despite	the	pretence	of	
actions	aimed	at	e.g.	protecting	German	architecture.	
Before 2016, there was relatively little discussion about ‘Germanisation’ 
and	most	of	it	was	connected	with	the	repeated	initiatives	to	rename	Kalinin-
grad	as	Königsberg,	while	the	criticism	was	limited	to	several	 ‘patriotic’	me-
dia	outlets.	The anti-Germanisers became much more active in the spring 
of 2016,	when	Nikolai Dolgachov	became	the	chief	of	the	regional	branch	of	
the	All-Russian	 State	 Television	 and	Radio	 Broadcasting	 Company	 (VGTRK,	
the	 largest	state-owned	media	holding).	Together	with	Andrey Vypolzov of	
the	Regnum	agency,	Dolgachov	unleashed	a	defamation	campaign	against	the	
alleged	 ‘Germanisers’	 (the	 ‘fifth	 column’).	 Among	 those	 targeted	 by	 the	 ac-
tion	were:	the	Kaliningrad-based	cultural	institution	German-Russian	House	













There are many indications that the intensification of the “anti-Ger-























Vypolzov but which was however supported by the secret services and 
was in line with their strategy in the Kaliningrad Oblast and the politi-
cal interests of the Kremlin.	Already	in	March	2016,	i.e.	before	Dolgachov’s	
arrival	in	Kaliningrad,	a	branch	of	the	Academy	of	Geopolitical	Problems	(af-
filiated	with	the	Ministry	of	Defence)	was	opened	in	this	city,	promoting	the	
narrative	of	a	 “powerful	 information	war	 in	 the	region”,	 in	which	Germany	
was	allegedly	carrying	out	activities	to	eradicate	Russian	identity.	In	the	fight	
against	“Germanisation”	the	BARS	case	was	used	instrumentally.	One	of	the	
things	 which	 this	 led	 to	 was	 the	 final	 crackdown	 on	 the	 German-Russian	
House	 (GRH),	 closed	 in	2017	 (there	are	many	 indications	 that	BARS	allowed	
itself	to	be	used	as	a	tool	in	a	provocation	against	the	management	of	the	GRH).	
The	case	of	 the	GRH	 is	a	 clear	 indication	of	the real objectives of the Rus-
sian authorities and services. They aim not only at ‘protecting Russian 
identity’ against the attempts of ‘Germanisers’ – they also seek to appro-
priate the concept of ‘Germanness’ in order to further Russian political, 
economic and secret service interests.	Shortly	after	the	closure	of	the	GRH	
in	October	2017,	it	was	reopened	as	an	entity	subordinated	to	the	official	struc-







Occasionally, the ‘opponents of Germanisation’ commit acts of hooligan-






The aggressive ‘anti-Germanisation’ efforts, consistent with the Kremlin-
promoted image of Russia as a ‘besieged fortress’, do not necessarily fit 




























cial positions of the Kaliningrad authorities,	including	Alikhanov	and	Tsu-
kanov	before	him, prove they wish to distance themselves from this kind 
of propaganda campaign (Alikhanov	 said	 in	2016	 that	 the	 issue	of	 the	Ka-
liningrad	Oblast’s	Germanisation	was	‘made	up’),	although	they	have	not	been	
actively	 countering	 this	 kind	 of	 initiative.	The position of the authorities 
on the demands for better protection of Kaliningrad’s post-German his-
torical heritage is also ambiguous. Most likely it is influenced by specific 
business interest of groups with links to the region’s authorities. Gover-
nor	Alikhanov	has	stopped	all	speculation	about	the	possibility	of	rebuilding	


































II. ecONOMIc SITuATION ANd POlIcy IN The 
KAlININGrAd OblAST
1. Social and economic situation
The	economic	situation	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	is	closely	dependent	on	the	
development	of	the	situation	in	the	whole	of	Russia.	After the collapse of 2015, 
the oblast’s economy has been growing for the last three years, and the 
region’s growth rate as well as most of the macroeconomic indicators 
















































chart 1. Gross regional product of Kaliningrad Oblast and industrial output, 





























[% y/y] [% GRP]
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ticular	 to	 the	 increase	 in	sales	on	the	automotive	and	mortgage	markets.	As	
a	result,	the	Avtotor	plant	located	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	–	one	of	the	larg-



































Chart 2. Personal debt levels in the Kaliningrad Oblast (in billions of roubles, 
as of first day of year and annual change in %) 
[% y/y][RUB billion]






















Source: Central Bank of Russia












Despite	positive	macroeconomic	trends,	the	standard of living in the Kalin-































has exceeded one million. However, the reason was not so much natural de-
mographic growth as a positive migration balance. Rosstat  show that 
on 1 January 2019, 1,002,271 people lived in the Oblast – that is 7,672 more than 
the year before. Although the birth rate was negative (10,316 people were born 
and 12,111 died), this was compensated for by a positive migration balance: 47,266 
people came to the region and 37,799 people l  e majority of the immigrants 
came from other regions of the Russian Federation, while the main foreign coun-
tries of origin included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.18 
Chart 3. Real incomes in the Kaliningrad Oblast
[RUB thousands] [% y/y]
2013 2017
Average real wages as % of previous year
Average salary in RUB thousands





























































2. The Kaliningrad Oblast in the economic policy of Moscow
In the last few years Moscow’s policy towards Kaliningrad Oblast has be-
come increasingly coherent and consistent. The Kremlin is visibly inter-
ested in the region and shows the political will to engage with it, which 
has resulted in an increase in federal spending in the region. 
On	 the	 one	 hand,	Moscow’s	 growing	 interest	 in	 the	 Kaliningrad	 region	 is	
an	element	of	the	Kremlin’s	regional	policy	being	implemented	throughout	
the	country,	which	aims	to	increase	the	centre’s	control,	including	economic	
control,	 over	 the	 regions,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 tightening	 the	 system	of	
public	finances	by	reducing	corruption-generating	mechanisms	and	increas-
ing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 public	 spending.	 However,	 due	 to	 Western	 sanc-
tions	 and	 limited	 opportunities	 to	 earn	 income	 abroad,	 public	 investment	
has	become	a	source	of	financing	and	a	way	to	expand	personal	wealth	for	
many	oligarchs	in	President	Putin’s	inner	circle	in	recent	years.	As	a	result	





It is a permanent feature of the Kremlin’s policy towards the Kaliningrad 
Oblast that it strives to find a balance between, on the one hand, isolating 
the region from its European and NATO neighbours and using it as a for-
eign policy instrument, and on the other, taking advantage of its special 
location to derive economic benefits for the region and Russia from coop-



























































only	30%.20	As	 it	 turned	out,	 though,	only	a	 few	residents	of	 the	zone	ben-




























Chart 4. Kaliningrad Oblast’s budget revenues and expenditures
Federal budget compensation for discontinued reliefs
Other financial support from the federal budget Budget expenditure




























Source: Ministry of Finance of the Kaliningrad Oblast


















second-largest	 group	 of	 new	businesses	 comprised	 agricultural	 and	 foodstuff	
companies.22	In	2018,	Kate-Development,	an	automotive	gearbox	manufacturer	
owned	by	Yekaterina	Ignatova,	also	became	registered	in	the	zone.	Kate-Devel-































The joint-stock company Avtotor is one of the largest manufacturers of for-
eign car brands in Russia. Its plants currently assemble cars for BMW, Hyun-
dai, KIA, TATA Daewoo and FAW. The company recorded a peak volume of 
production in 2012 when it manufactured 265,000 vehicles. Since the slump 
in 2015 when its output decreased to around 90,000 cars, the company has 
been increasing its production volume. In 2017, the company recorded growth 
of over 50% and, according to preliminary data, its production increased by 
a further 40% in 2018 – to approximately 203,000 cars and trucks. Avtotor 
sales increased by 12% and 13% respectively in this period.
Avtotor is the cornerstone of the Kaliningrad Oblast’s economy, accounting for:
– around 50% of the Kaliningrad Oblast’s manufacturing sector; 
– 57% of the region’s maritime and rail container shipments; 
– 39% of taxes paid in the Kaliningrad Oblast. 
However, of the approximately 67 billion roubles of taxes paid in 2018, only 
approximately 1 billion roubles were allocated to the regional budget. The 
company could receive about 45 billion roubles (about US$ 0.8 billion) in 
compensation from the federal budget for the abolition of reduced tariffs 
in 2018.
It is not clear who the real owner of the corporation is. In the early 1990s, 
Vladimir Shcherbakov founded Avtotor (originally as a KIA assembly 
plant in the Kaliningrad Oblast) and according to media reports, he con-
trolled about 99.9% of the company. During the years of the Soviet Union, 
Shcherbakov worked as an engineer and then as a director in the VAZ and 
Kamaz car factories, then pursued a political career in Moscow and in 























and Forecasting of the USSR (previously this department was called the 
State Committee for Economic Planning of the USSR). According to media 
reports, in 2016 Shcherbakov transferred his shares to his son Sergei, who 
lives in Switzerland. Sergei controls Avtotor through the Automotive De-
velopment Holding, registered in 2016 in Luxembourg and wholly owned 
by the Automotive Development Group Limited, registered in Hong Kong, 
also in 2016.
Considering that the Shcherbakov family does not belong to the core of 
the current Russian political and business elite, that it controls the plant 
through tax havens (at a time when President Putin is forcing Russian 
business to repatriate capital) and receives multi-billion-dollar compen-
sation from the state budget, it may be assumed that the real beneficiaries 
of the company are not the Shcherbakov family, but people from Putin’s 
inner circle.




The launch of the “Marshal Vasilevsky” floating LNG regasification ter-
minal in January 2019	was	a	key	investment	in	ensuring	the	gas	self-suffi-
ciency	of	the	region.
The floating lNG regasification terminal in the Kaliningrad Oblast
The regasification capacity of the floating LNG regasification terminal is 
2.3 million tonnes (approximately 3.1 billion m3) and the storage capacity 
is 174,000 m3. The unit was manufactured at the Korean shipyard Hyun-
dai Heavy Industries in early January 2017, but due to damage to one of 
the regasification boilers it was handed over to Gazprom with an almost 
one-year delay, on 31 October 2018. Delays were also caused by the dam-
age to the coastal infrastructure due to the storm in the Baltic Sea in 
November 2017. The project also required the construction of the appro-
priate offshore infrastructure, i.e. a 3.5 km long sea gas pipeline, leading 
from the terminal to the land part of the port and the offshore infrastruc-























US$ 295 million (excluding VAT). The total budget including the costs 
of building the infrastructure in the Kaliningrad port (where Gennady 
Timchenko’s Stroytransneftegaz was the contractor) amounted to RUB 
60 billion (around 1 billion US$). 
The investment is part of the Russian strategy of strengthening the energy 
independence of the Kaliningrad Oblast. However, it is unlikely that the 














US$	 70	per	 1,000	m3,	while	LNG	prices	 on	 the	European	market	 ranged	be-
tween	US$	200–300	per	1,000	m3	in	2018).	In	addition,	Gazprom	would	not	be	















































































































































































































































































































































































































































Meanwhile, the gas pipeline network in the region has been extended,	
which	is	an	element	of	Gazprom’s	nationwide	strategy	for	the	expansion	of	gas	










by	 Gazprombank,	 is	 building	 a	 small	 LNG	 production	 plant	 in	 Kaliningrad	
with	an	annual	capacity	of	150,000	tonnes,	to	be	completed	in	2019.	
Gazprom has also been expanding its gas storage facilities in the Kalinin-
grad region.27	In	September	2013,	the	construction	of	the	first	two	gas	depots	
was	completed.	 In	December	2017	a	 further	 two	were	completed.	Their	 total	
capacity	 is	 currently	 174	million	m3.	Ultimately,	meaning	by	2025,	Gazprom	
plans	to	increase	their	number	to	14,	and	their	total	capacity	to	800	million	m3	
(daily	delivery	capacity	will	amount	to	12	million	m3).
The development of infrastructure enabling the use of natural gas as 










































liningrad	Nuclear	Power	Plant30	project,	Moscow has been developing elec-






with	 a	 capacity	of	 156	MW	each,	were	officially	 commissioned.	On	6	March	
2019,	in	the	presence	of	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Dmitry	Kozak	and	Minister	of	
Energy	Alexander	Novak,	 the	Pregolskaya	gas-fired	 thermal	power	plant	 in	
the	Guryevsk	region	of	Kaliningrad	(with	a	capacity	of	455.2	MW)	was	com-



















































ening	 of	 the	 region’s	 energy	 self-sufficiency	 –	 it	 is	 also	 intended	at enabling 
the discontinuation of electricity transmission through Lithuania in the 








2.3. Development of the transport potential
In	the	last	two	years	an increase in spending on the transport sector in the 
Kaliningrad region could be observed. On	the	one	hand,	the aim of these 
measures has been to reduce its transport dependence on transit through 
Lithuania, Belarus or Poland	by	expanding	the	seaports	and	the	airport.	On	
the	other,	these investments are intended to make it possible to use the 
transit potential of the region, particularly for the dynamically growing 




(1,435	mm)	and	broad	 (1,520	mm)	gauge	 tracks,	as	well	as	 its	ports,	Russia’s	
only	ice-free	seaports	in	the	Baltic	Sea.
The	 actions	 taken	 so	 far	 by	 the	 Russian	 authorities,	 especially	 in	 the	 last	
two	 years,	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	 creation of two transport and logis-

























Dzerzhinskaya-Novaya station and in Chernyakhovsk,	 which	 are	 capa-












The ambition of the Russian authorities is to create an industrial park 
around the terminal in Chernyakhovsk which will specialise in trans-
port and logistics, and in the production of building materials.	This	pro-
ject,	 currently	 in	 the	pre-investment	phase,	was	modelled	on	 the	 industrial	
park	and	dry	port	in	Khorgos	on	the	border	between	China	and	Kazakhstan.35	
The success of the plans to create a transport hub in the Kaliningrad region 
will largely depend on the shape of Russia’s relations with Lithuania and 





entrepreneurs	 for	part	of	 the	railway	freight	 tariffs	were	withdrawn	in	2018,	




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The	 incorporation	of	 the	Kaliningrad	ports	 into	 the	SEZ	 in	2018	means	 that	















































The	 expansion of Khrabrovo Airport,	 completed	 in	 2018	 before	 the	 FIFA	
World	Cup,	has	been	very	 important	 for	 increasing	 regional	passenger	 traf-
fic	without	the	need	to	use	transit	routes.	The	airport	is	owned	by	Novaport,	
a	company	controlled	by	the	billionaire	Roman	Trotsenko,	who	is	(among	his	














During	 the	 implementation	 phase	 these	 projects	 have	 undoubtedly	 contrib-
uted	to	the	dynamic	growth	of	investments	in	the	region,	providing	employ-
ment	 and	 contracts	 for	many	 local	businesses	 in	 recent	years.	 In	 the	 longer	
term,	however,	some	projects,	such	as	investments	in	the	energy	sector	or	the	




























siphon off state funds to the private accounts of selected oligarchs through 









The	2018 World Cup in Russia	has	turned	out	to	be	the	most	expensive	FIFA	
World	Cup	of	all	time,	consuming	more	than	US$	13	billion.	Its organisation 
was largely financed from the state budget and benefited the business 


























































ing	 costs	until	 2023.	The	regional	 authorities	 argue	 that it is impossible to 
maintain the stadium with revenues from organising matches of Kalin-
ingrad Baltika Football Club or other sports and cultural events, as the 




large	 investment	project	 the	Russian	authorities	are	planning	 in	 the	region:	


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































III.  The KAlININGrAd OblAST ANd ITS exTerNAl 
eNvIrONMeNT
1. cross-border political relations 
The Kaliningrad Oblast’s cross-border relations with the outside world 
are subordinated to the logic of Russia’s authoritarian system of govern-
ment and the increasingly centralised way in which Moscow has gov-
erned the regions for several years. This means that Kaliningrad cannot 
independently choose the directions and forms of its external co-opera-
tion. Its external policy is shaped and controlled by the federal authori-
ties. However, even though the relations between the Kaliningrad Oblast 
and its neighbours are significantly influenced by the status of the Krem-
lin’s relations with its foreign partners, they are still noticeably better 







The problem of navigation on the vistula lagoon in Polish-russian 
relations 
As a result of territorial changes after World War II, the territory of the 
former German East Prussia, including the Vistula Lagoon, was divided 
between the USSR and Poland. Therefore, the only waterway connect-
ing the baltic Sea with the vistula lagoon and the port in elbląg led 
from now through the baltiysk Strait, situated entirely within the 
territory of the uSSr. The rules of navigation through the straits and the 
Vistula Lagoon were established by the protocol to the Polish-Soviet agree-
ment on the state border of 16 August 1945. In accordance with the protocol, 
the USSR guaranteed the free movement of merchant ships under the Pol-
ish flag to and from Poland in peacetime. Access of third country vessels 
was subject to the decision of the Soviet authorities. Since July 1991, Poland 
has been holding talks with the USSR and then with the Russian Federation 
regarding the signing of a new agreement. Poland has sought, among other 























side was against this because the port of Baltiysk in the Baltiysk Strait was 
the main base of the Russian (and previously Soviet) Baltic Fleet. For this 
reason, and in connection with the plans to develop the port of Elbląg, in 
1993 Poland put forward the idea of a Vistula Spit canal to create an alter-
native waterway, but for a long time this project remained in the sphere of 
broad concepts. In 2004, Russia tightened the rules for foreign ships to use 
the route through the Baltiysk Strait, and in 2006 it completely blocked it. 
Navigation became possible again after the September 2009signing of the 
Polish-Russian agreement on the terms of navigation (providing for free-
dom of movement for merchant ships of Poland and Russia, which could 
be temporarily restricted on the grounds of environmental or security and 
defence considerations). Third country vessel traffic was allowed on a lim-
ited basis under the unilateral Russian regulation of July 2009, which could 
be withdrawn at any time. It requires vessels to apply for a permit to pass 
the straits 15 days in advance. The cost of the permit is 50 euros per vessel. 
In practice, this system is not being widely used. In 2006–2007 and again 
in 2016, the Polish government returned to the idea of cutting a navigable 
canal through the Vistula Spit. In February 2017 the act on this issue was 
adopted, in December 2018 a tender for the execution of the investment was 
announced, and in February 2019 a building permit was issued and pre-
paratory works were commenced.


























According to the Polish government’s plans, the navigable canal through 
the vistula Spit is to be built in the area of the former village of Nowy 
Świat, it will be 1,260 m long, 20 to 60 m wide and 5 m deep. The infra-
structure is to include a lock, storm gates, breakwaters, two drawbridges, 
a parking position and border crossing facilities. The canal will allow the 























and with a draught of up to 4 m. The expected cost of the project is PLN 880 
million, and the investment is to be completed by 2022. The official goal of 
the project is to create a new waterway independent of Russia, connecting 
the Baltic Sea, via the Vistula Lagoon, with the port in Elbląg. This will al-
low for the port to be expanded and for increasing revenues from freight 
transport. The canal is also intended to increase tourist traffic in the region 
(including sailing) and to improve defence capabilities by allowing access 
to small naval and border guard vessels. 
The project to build a navigable canal through the Vistula Spit on the terri-
tory of Poland is causing negative reactions in russia, both at the official 
level and in the media, although official reactions have so far been limited 
to the lower political levels. As far as the federal authorities are concerned, 
in September 2017 the Minister for the Environment and Natural Resourc-
es of the Russian Federation, Sergei Donskoy, sent a letter to Jan Szyszko, 
the Polish Minister for the Environment, calling on the Polish authorities 
to provide the neighbouring states with comprehensive information on the 
project and to consult with Russia on its potential harmful consequences 
before taking a final decision on the implementation of the project. In Au-
gust 2018, the Deputy Minister for Agriculture and the Head of the Federal 
Fisheries Agency of the Russian Federation, Ilya Shestakov, sent an official 
letter to the EU Commissioner for the Environment, Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries, Karmenu Vella, complaining that the Polish authorities did not 
consult the draft with the Russian side, drawing attention to potential envi-
ronmental and economic threats to Russia and calling for an analysis of the 
problem and for preventive measures to be taken. In December 2018, a com-
muniqué was published stating that the Minister for Natural Resources 
and the Environment, Dmitry Kobylkin, had expressed his concern about 
the project in a conversation with his Polish counterpart Henryk Kowal-
czyk during the climate summit in Katowice, and had called for an envi-
ronmental impact assessment and consultations to be conducted. Critical 
opinions about the project have been expressed by individual members of  
the Russian Parliament and the Human Rights Council of the President  
of the Russian Federation (in a statement issued in February 2019).
As far as the Kaliningrad authorities are concerned, in March 2017 the act-
ing governor Anton Alikhanov announced his decision to establish a special 
working group consisting of 17 people: officials, experts and environmental 
activists, whose task would be to analyse the (mainly environmental) ef-























group prepared a report in the summer of 2017 (not published), which was 
forwarded to Moscow to the Ministry of Natural Resources and the En-
vironment. In his statements, Alikhanov has suggested that the project, 
which could cause environmental and economic damage to the region, is 
more of a political, military and strategic project than an economic one, but 
the regional authorities do not want to “lecture the Poles”, although they 
do expect them to consult with the Russian side (April 2017). On another 
occasion he stated that the project may have a negative impact on the envi-
ronmental situation in the Vistula Lagoon, but the regional authorities are 
not treating it as a threat (January 2019). Critical views of the project have 
been expressed by Kaliningrad officials, experts and environmental activ-
ists speaking to the media. The Kaliningrad news outlets have provided ex-
tensive information about the successive decisions of the Polish authorities 
concerning the project and have reported on the debate on the project in 
Poland, mainly quoting critical opinions. 
The Russian narrative on the canal project is mainly about environmental 
concerns. In particular, it has been argued that it will increase the salinity 
of the waters of the Vistula Lagoon and threaten its populations of fresh-
water fish (which will cause losses to fisheries in the Kaliningrad region), 
threaten bird habitats and disturb the migration routes of migratory spe-
cies, change the layout of sea currents and have a negative impact on the 
Vistula Spit coasts. In 2017, Russian commentators started to raise security 
arguments more often. In their view, the canal would contribute to a mili-
tarisation of the Polish border area, lead to the creation of new Polish and 
NATO military installations (some Russian statements allege it concerns, 
among other issues, the planned reclaimed silt island on the Vistula La-
goon), thus creating new threats to the Kaliningrad Oblast’s military secu-
rity. Political and legal arguments have also been raised. Poland has been 
accused of failing to consult the project with the Russian side, despite it 
negatively affecting the Kaliningrad Oblast. This amounts to a violation of 
international law, as does the unilateral decision to transform a section of 
the Vistula Spit into an island (in reality Russia is not a party to the inter-
national Espoo Convention on cross-border environmental impact assess-
ments and as such cannot enforce any rights under it and can only rely on 
the good will of the Polish side).
Despite the worsened relations, both Poland and Lithuania have main-
tained cross-border contacts with the Kaliningrad Oblast on issues 























cooperation programmes and within the framework of programmes ap-
proved and financed by the European Union.
Interregional cooperation between Polish voivodeships (Pomeranian	and	
Warmia-Masuria) and the Kaliningrad Oblast takes	place	within	the	frame-
work	of	the	Polish-Russian	Council	for	the	Cooperation	of	Regions	of	the	Re-
public	of	Poland	with	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 (the	
last	meeting	was	held	in	October	2016	in	Olsztyn).	Eleven	thematic	committees	
operate	within	 the	 council,	 including	 the	 committees	 for:	 border	 crossings,	
transport,	agriculture,	culture,	sport,	and	tourism	and	environmental	protec-
tion.	Despite	 the	 suspension	of	official	 contacts	at	 the	council	 level,	ongoing	
working	contacts	have	been	maintained,	including	between	border	guards.	
Contact	also	takes	the	form	of	meetings	of:	the	chambers	of	industry	and	com-



















































2018	 (in	December	 2016	 it	was	 approved	 by	 the	European	Commission,	 and	
a	 year	 later	 a	 financing	 agreement	was	 signed	 between	 Poland,	 Russia	 and	
























































it	 is	possible	to	 learn	Lithuanian	in	public	schools	 in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	




2. cross-border travel 
The residents of the Kaliningrad Oblast are more mobile than the aver-











introduced	against	Russia,	the value of the rouble decreased significantly,	
which	in	turn	reduced	the	purchasing	power	of	Kaliningrad	residents	and	the	
attractiveness	of	shopping	in	EU	countries.	Two	years	later	(2016)	Poland	de-
cided	to	suspend the local border traffic regime which	had	enabled	easier	
and	cost-free	crossing	of	the	border	with	Poland	–	a	decision	that	may	have	also	
contributed	to	the	decrease	in	the	number	of	visitors	from	Kaliningrad.
In	2015,	 in	 the	 last	 year	 of	when	 the	 local	 border	 traffic	 regime	was	 still	 in	















































After	the	devaluation	of	 the	rouble	 in	2014,	 there	was	a	decrease	 in	value	of	
foreigners’	 purchases	 declared	 on	 the	 Polish-Russian	 land	 border	 in	 Poland	
(which	started	to	rise	again	only	in	2017	as	the	rouble	stabilised).	In	the	case	
of	Polish	citizens,	 the	suspension	of	 the	 local	border	traffic	regime	has	been	





























Table 1. Border traffic and spending by Kaliningrad residents in Poland and 
by Polish nationals in Russia 
border crossings (thousands) Spending (PlN millions)
Foreigners Poles Foreigners Poles
2014 3,355 3,357 866 496
2015 2,800 3,300 581 442
2016
3,300 2,000 481 283
2017 2,600 1,400 568 224












The Kaliningrad region is among the top ten Russian regions with the 

































Chart 6. Kaliningrad Oblast’s trade exchange







machinery, equipment and means of transport





















Source: Customs Service of the Kaliningrad Oblast
Agricultural products and foods are the Kaliningrad Oblast’s main ex-
port commodity, accounting	for	around	65%	of	total	exports. However,	this	
category	of	exports	has	been	monopolised	by	a	single	company,	Sodruzhestvo	






















































Kaliningrad	Oblast,	making	it	one	of	Kaliningrad’s	 ten	 largest	 importers.	At	
US$	 64	million,	 Lithuania’s	 purchases	were	much	 lower;	 the	 country	 ranks	
just	outside	the	top	ten	importers.	















Exports to LithuaniaExports to Poland
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Source: Customs Service of the Kaliningrad Oblast












portant	 countries	 of	 origin.	However,	 their	 exports	 in	US$	 terms	 remained	






















































































Nevertheless, the importance of Kaliningrad’s co-operation with Lithu-
ania and Poland in the rail sector has been growing for the last two years 
because of Russia’s plans to make the Kaliningrad Oblast a transport hub 
for Asia–Europe–Asia freight.	The	success	of	this	plan	hinges	on	the	readiness	
on	the	part	of	Kaliningrad’s	neighbours	to	become	more	open	to	rail	transit.	
Freight connections between the Kaliningrad Oblast and mainland 
russia
Around half of the transport services provided by the region concern the 
transport of goods between the region and mainland Russia. The volume 
of intra-Russian transport in 2017 was about 6 million tonnes (3.5 million 
tonnes of imports and 2.5 million tonnes of exports).51 The land rail links 
(accounting for approximately 4.5–5 million tons per year) are the main 
freight transport routes providing supplies to the Kaliningrad region. 
There are currently two routes connecting the Kaliningrad Oblast 
with the rest of russia: 
•	 the northern route	–	via	Lithuania,	Latvia	and	on	to	Russia
•	 the southern route – via	Lithuania	and	Belarus;	the	trains	enter	Russia	
on	its	border	with	Belarus.	
Thanks to the broad gauge track network in Lithuania and Latvia, Russian 
trains do not have to waste time reloading their goods. However, the neces-
sity to cross two borders and use the services of carriers from the other 
countries makes the cost of transporting goods by rail from/to the oblast 
through the territory of Lithuania and Belarus about 40% more expensive 
than transporting goods over the same distance within Russia.
The direct delivery of goods to the Kaliningrad region from Russia (without 
going through transit countries) is possible via the baltiysk–ust-luga sea 
ferry connection (which is also served by train ferries). Currently, this 
connection is served by two ferries built back in the 1980s, which transport 

























The Avtotor plant located in the Kaliningrad Oblast is the key customer of 
the Kaliningrad transport sector. In 2017 the company accounted for 69% 
of container transhipments at the port of Kaliningrad and 65% at the port 
in Baltiysk, as well 36% of all freight transport by the Kaliningrad Railway. 
The cars manufactured by Avtotor are delivered to the Russian market 























Iv.  SecurITy ANd deFeNce SITuATION 
ANd POlIcy IN The KAlININGrAd OblAST




aspect,	are	particularly	active	in	the	oblast.	The structures of the Federal Se-
curity Service (FSB) and the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which are 
responsible for counter-espionage protection and governmental special 
communications, play a special role there.	Due	to	the	significant	activity	of	
military	units	stationed	in	the	area,	the activity of FSB military counterin-
telligence has been increasing. Kaliningrad also remains a base for intel-
ligence operations in Lithuania and Poland. 
The	creation	in	April	2016	of	the	National Guard of the Russian Federation	
(Rosgvardia)	initiated	the	process	of	reorganising	the	units	previously	com-
prised	 in	 the	 Internal	Troops	 and	 special	units	 of	 the	 Interior	Ministry,	 in-





Since 2016, a number of reshuffles have taken place in the top leader-
ship of the power and defence ministries’ regional directorates.	Their	
characteristic	feature	has	been	that	posts	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	were	as-
signed	to	officers	who	had	no	previous	links	with	the	region	and	no	contacts	
with	representatives	of	 the	 local	political	and	business	elite.	This	 indicates	
that	their main task was to make personnel changes in subordinate in-
stitutions and to take over control of existing corruption schemes from 
local entrepreneurs, enforcement institutions and the army.	In	2016,	the	
































































































































































































































































































































































































In December 2016, Major General Igor Illarionov became the Head of the 









The	 reshuffles	 in	 the	FSB regional directorate in Kaliningrad	were	 simi-
lar	 in	nature.	 In	2016,	when	 its	 then	head,	Yevgeny	Zinichev	 (now	Minister	
for	Emergency	Situations),	was	promoted	to	acting	governor,	he	was	replaced	
as	the	FSB	chief	in	Kaliningrad	by	Major	General	Leonid	Mikhailyuk,	trans-
ferred	 from	Vologda.	 In	 the	autumn	of	2018,	after	Mikhailyuk	 took	office	 in	
occupied	Crimea,	Valery	Belitsky,	 the	 former	head	of	 the	FSB	directorate	 in	
Kemerovo	region,	became	the	FSB’s	regional	chief	in	Kaliningrad.	This	string	
of	reshuffles	in	Kaliningrad’s	FSB	is	a	strong	indication	that	the	leadership of 















tivities	 interpreted	as	 threatening	 the	stability	of	 the	system	of	power.	 It is 
also a unique feature of the Kaliningrad branches of the institutions of 
force that their work is heavily focused on counteracting activities in-























with Russia.	They	have	 succeeded	 in	 suppressing	 the	 activity	 of	 communi-
ties	advocating	cooperation	with	Germany	in	various	areas,	a	clear	example	
of	which	was	the	closure	of	the	German-Russian	House	in	January	2017.	The	





Ukrainian	 organisations,	 had	 been	 sentenced	 to	 eight	 years’	 imprisonment.	
According	to	the	indictment,	he	had	been	under	surveillance	since	2015,	be-
cause	of	his	activities	that	were	extremist	 in	nature	and	involved	the	inten-
tion	 to	 take	up	 service	 in	an	 illegal	military	 formation.	The activity of the 















































intelligence activities, officers of the Russian secret services in the Kalin-





2. Military situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast
In 2017–2018 Russia stepped up the modernisation and expansion of military 
capabilities in the Kaliningrad region, contributing to a visible increase in 
the offensive capabilities of the Russian armed forces deployed there.	








potential	reinforcements	if	necessary.	As the infrastructure modernisation 
process started, it was associated with the progressive professionalisation 
of troops (and therefore higher requirements from soldiers as to the condi-
tions of service) and, most importantly, with a gradual shift towards new 





for	 general	military	units	 (e.g.	 for	 the	newly	 formed	 11th	Tank	Regiment,	 dis-
cussed	in	more	detail	below),	as	well	as	for	the	support	and	logistic	backup	fa-
cilities.	Particularly	notable	is	the	reconstruction of the ammunition storage 



























tober 2018, the modernised and expanded Chkalovsk airfield was finally 
put into operation after	work	commenced	in	2012	were	completed.	It is now 
one of the largest military airfields in Russia,	capable	of	handling	virtually	






the	context	of	the	reconstruction of the Chernyakhovsk	airfield,	where	all	







2.2. Expansion of the armed forces group 
In	2018	the	Kaliningrad	contingent	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion	started to expand its air and land units, focusing first of all on the 
formation of offensive units – for	the	first	time	after	decades	of	cuts	followed	
by	 stagnation.	Two fighter aviation regiments were reactivated (part	 of	
the	72nd	Air	Base,	since	May	2019	the	132nd	Mixed	Aviation	Division),	as	well	










24MR.	 In	 the	 autumn	 of	 2018,	 the	 unit	 reached	 combat	 readiness	with	 two	
























was	nearing	completion.	The	689th	Regiment	was	 formed	on	 the	basis	of	 the	
fighter	squadron	of	the	former	72nd	Air	Base.	Unlike	the	4th	Naval	Attack	Avia-
tion	Regiment,	it	is	equipped	solely	with	aircraft	of	the	Su-27	family.	As a con-
sequence of the re-creation of the two aviation regiments, the staff and 
command structures of the entire aviation contingent in the Kalinin-
grad Oblast were expanded and the 72nd Air Base was transformed into 
the 132nd Mixed Aviation Division. In addition to the regiments named 
above, in the 132nd Division a helicopter regiment is being formed. 
In	January	2019,	the	Russian	Defence	Ministry	confirmed	that	the	11th Inde-
pendent Tank Regiment (Gusev) had been formed	as	part	of	the	11th	Army	
Corps,54	equipped	with	upgraded	T-72B	tanks.	The	unit	was	created	by	trans-
forming	 the	 independent	 tank	battalion	 created	 in	 July	2018.	Upgrading	 it	




The	formation	of	a	 tank	regiment	 in	the	oblast	should	be	seen	as	the first, 





The	plans	for	2019	include	establishing an additional (third) missile divi-
sion (in Donskoye) as part of the 25th Coastal Missile Regiment,	equipped	
with	 the	 Bal	 systems.	When	 that	 happens,	 the	 regiment	will	 comprise	 two	








































the	Kaliningrad	 contingent	 of	 the	Armed	Forces	 of	 the	Russian	Federation	
has	long	remained	on	the	margins	of	the	Russian	military’s	technical	mod-






area.	The Kaliningrad contingent started receiving new offensive weap-
ons only in late 2016.57
























































at	 land	 targets.	 If	 the	Bastions	 are	used	 as	 intended,	 i.e.	 as	 carriers	 of	 anti-
warship	missiles,	their	deployment	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	transforms	the	









systems	this	year.	In total, by the end of 2019 the Kaliningrad Oblast will 
host six full squadrons equipped with S-400 systems (48 launchers, a to-
tal of 192 simultaneously fired missiles), putting the region in second po-
sition after the Moscow Oblast in terms of the density of the S-400 deploy-




































In	 December	 2016,	 Chernyakhovsk	 saw	 the	 first	 arrival	 of	new Su-30SM 





to	 create	 a	 full	 squadron.62	Additional	 aircraft	 from	 the	Su-27 family have	
also	been	redeployed	to	the	689th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	in	the	Kalinin-
grad	Oblast	from	the	790th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	(Khotilovo	in	the	Tver	





are	not	the	most	advanced	model	in	the	Russian	army,64	but the restoration of 
armoured units in the region should definitely be seen as the most impor-
tant factor in strengthening the offensive capabilities of the ground troops 
stationed in the exclave.	Before	July	2018,	when	the	first	elements	of	the	future	
11th	Tank	Regiment	were	formed,	the	Russian	Ground	Forces	in	the	Kaliningrad	
Oblast	had	only	41	tanks	(a	battalion	in	the	79th	Mechanised	Brigade).	When the 











































Infantry	Brigade	will	result	in	an increase in the total number of tanks held by 
units of the 11th Army Corps in the Kaliningrad Oblast to 300 by the begin-




Baltic	 Sea	 in	 2017–2018	 almost	 seem	 insignificant	 (and	 it	 should	 be	 remem-
bered	 that	 the	entire	Kaliningrad	contingent	 is	directly	subordinated	 to	 the	
Baltic	Fleet	Command	and	is	regarded	as	the	fleet’s	air	and	land	component).	
The	only	exception	concerns	the seven modernised anti-submarine Ka-27M 
helicopters which	the	Baltic	Fleet	acquired	by	October	2018.	This	number	cor-
responds	to	a	third	of	all	the	land-based	anti-submarine	helicopters	upgraded	
so	far	for	the	Russian	Navy,	which	demonstrates that preparations to coun-
ter NATO submarines in the Baltic are treated as a priority.
The prototype Karakurt-class / project 22800 missile corvette, the Myt-
ishchi, is the only new Baltic Fleet warship deployed in Baltiysk.	 It	 en-
tered	service	in	December	2018	and	is	armed	mainly	with	Kalibr	missiles.	In 
2019, the Baltiysk contingent is expected to be reinforced with another 






































Four Steregushchiy-class / project 20380 corvettes	started	service	in	the	Baltic	





tion).	It	has	been	decided	that	all	of	these	should all be adapted to be capable of 





years.	Since mid-2017 at the latest, i.e. since preparations to the Zapad-2017 
strategic drill, units stationed in the exclave have significantly stepped 













































 – countering the enemy’s means of air attack (aircraft and missiles);
 – striking targets deep behind enemy lines;
 – countering groupings of naval units;
 – detecting and countering submarines;
 – carrying out landings behind enemy lines using the combined method 
(with fast landing craft and helicopters);
 – distorting the enemy’s command and communications systems.
The training that takes place suggest that it is assumed the Kaliningrad 
contingent would carry out operations independently of the main forces 
of the Russian army in the western strategic direction (from Moscow’s 
perspective).	The	drills	include	moving	aircraft	to	alternate	airfields	and	re-
moving	warships	 from	 enemy	 impact	 area.	The	 defence	manoeuvres	 devel-
oped	by	the	11th	Army	Corps	suggest	that	the	main	task	of	this	unit	would	be	to	
engage	enemy	forces.	It	is	notable	that	the	4th	Separate	Naval	Attack	Aviation	







Provocations against NATO forces, which have been occurring at least since 
2014 and which usually involve the Air Force (such	as	violations	of	airspace,	



































ously	been	limited,	the	social and political situation	in	the	region	in	the	com-
ing	years	will	be	heavily	influenced	by	the	general	trends	in	Russia.	The	Krem-
lin’s	intention	will	invariably	be	to	maintain	full	control	of	the	region	and	to	























largest	business	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast.	 It	 is	also	uncertain	if	 investment	
demand	can	be	sustained	at	the	current	level.	Most	of	the	large	infrastructure	
projects	that	have	been	driving	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast’s	economy	have	already	


















































July	2019,	 the	 region	may	expect	 an	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	 tourists.	The	





In	 the	 security sphere, the	 Kaliningrad	 Oblast	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 closely	




































































Appendix 1. Selected social and economic indicators of the Kaliningrad Oblast
2015 2016 2017 2018





-8.8 1.4 1.9 3.1
Agricultural output
(change in %)
10.2 -4.9 0.3 9.1
Construction
(value of work carried out)
(change in %)
10.4 9.2 25.1 43.2
Retail
(change in %)
-6.2 -0.7 1.1 5
Inflation (December to December) 11.7 4.7 2.8 4.8
Investments in share capital
(change in %)
-3.7 15.5 37.4 -3.9
Real incomes
(change in %)
-2.5 -7.5 -1 -1
Real wages (in businesses, change in %) -9.2 -2.9 0.4 4.1
Bank debts of natural persons (jointly, in 
roubles and foreign currencies) under con-
tract in the Kaliningrad Oblast











by 1 Jan. 2019)
Unemployment (in %) 5.9 6 5.2 4.6
Regional budget revenues (RUB billions) 59 85.5 111 126
of this, support from the federal budget  
(in % of total budget revenue)
32 51 60 60
Regional budget spending (RUB billions) 70 88 114 124
Surplus/Deficit
(RUB billions)
























Appendix 2. Economic situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast as compared to the 
rest of Russia (2018)
Kaliningrad Oblast russia
GRP per capita (RUB thousands, 2017) 421.5 510.3
Real income dynamics (change in %) -1 -0.2
Industrial output (change in %) 3.1 2.9
Manufacturing (change in %) 3.6 2.6
Construction (change in %) 43.2 5.3
Retail (change in %) 5 2.6
























Appendix 3. Kaliningrad Oblast’s trade co-operation with Poland and Lithuania 
(US$	millions)
2015 2016 2017 2018
Total exports: 2,742 1,239 1,270 1,998
Exports to Poland 117 70 52 101
Exports to Lithuania 93 75 49 64
Total imports: 7,965 5,809 7,209 8,249
Imports from Poland 434 353 388 387
Imports from Lithuania 140 113 117 114























Appendix 4. Units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation stationed in 
the Kaliningrad Oblast (as of end of February 2019)
(general military and combat support sub-units and their basic weapons in compli-
ance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, CFE are specified 
along with the make-up of the units; colour print signifies units formed and arms 
provided after 1 December 2016)
Central subordination units
 – 1407th Central Artillery Armaments Base – Kaliningrad
Ground Forces (units	reporting	directly	to	the	command	of	the	Western	Mili-
tary	District)
 – 82nd Radio-Engineering Brigade – Primorye (part of the unit, the other part 
is located in the Smolensk Oblast)
 – 841st Radio-Electronic Combat Centre – Yantarny
Aerospace Forces
 – NN. Radio-Technical Node (Voronezh-DM radar station) – Pionersky
 – 26th Measurement Point (Sazhen-TM quantum-optical station, Fazan com-
mand and measurement system)
Naval Forces (Baltic Fleet) 
Maritime	component:
 – 128th Surface Ship Brigade – Baltiysk (two project 11540 frigates, four project 
20380 corvettes equipped with Kalibr missiles; two project 965A destroyer ships 
were withdrawn from service in 2016 – Bespokoyny	was	turned	into	a	museum	
ship	and	Nastoychivy	has	re-entered	service	and	will	be	upgraded	in	2019);
 – 71st Landing Ship Brigade – Baltiysk (four project 775/775M landing ships, 
two project 12322 Zubr air-cushioned landing crafts, two project 21820 























 – 64th Maritime Region Protection Brigade – Baltiysk (146th Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Tactical Group – 6 project 1331M anti-submarine corvettes; 232nd 
Trawler Division – four project 12650 base minesweepers, six project 13000 
and 10750 roadstead minesweepers; 313th Spetsnaz Division);
 – 36th Missile Boat Brigade – Baltiysk (1st Missile Boat Squadron – seven pro-
ject 12411/12411M missile corvettes; 106th Small Missile Ship Squadron – 
four project 12341 missile corvettes; NN Small Missile Ship Squadron – two 
project 21631 missile corvettes; one	project	22800	corvette);	a	second	project	
22800	corvette	to	enter	service	in	2019);
 – 342nd Emergency and Rescue Division – Baltiysk (twelve rescue and fire 
protection units);
 – 72nd Reconnaissance Ship Squadron – Baltiysk (two medium-sized project 
864 reconnaissance ships, two small project 503M reconnaissance ships);
 – 603rd Hydrographic Ship Squadron – Baltiysk (one project 861 hydrographic 
ship, seven hydrographic boats);
 – 51st Hydrographic Service Region – Baltiysk (six hydrographic boats);
 – Group of Supply Units – Baltiysk (eleven auxiliary units, including two 
tankers and eight tugs).
Land component:
 – 336th Naval Infantry Brigade – Baltiysk (two marine infantry battalions, 
one landing and assault battalion, two artillery squadrons; 134 BTR-80/82A 
armoured personnel carriers, eighteen 122 mm 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled 
howitzers, twelve 120 mm 2S9 Nona-S self-propelled howitzers, six 122 mm 
BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers); plans	to	restore	a	tank	battalion;
 – 561st Maritime Reconnaissance Point – Parusnoye (two Spetsnaz companies);
 – 25th Coastal Missile Regiment – Donskoye (two missile squadrons; four Bal 
missile launchers, four	Bastion	missile	launchers);	a	third	missile	squad-
ron	to	be	developed	in	2019	(four	Bal	missile	launchers);
























 – a squadron of anti-submarine helicopters from the 72nd Airbase (eventually 
included in the newly formed helicopter regiment of the 132nd Mixed Air 
Division) – Donskoye (fourteen Ka-27PL/PS anti-submarine helicopters, 
seven	Ka-27M	anti-submarine	helicopters,	three	Ka-29	helicopters).




 – 7th Mechanised Regiment – Kaliningrad (three mechanised battalions, one 
tank battalion, a squadron of self-propelled artillery; 85 BMP-2 infantry 
fighting vehicles, 30 T-72B tanks, eighteen 152 mm 2S3 Akatsiya self-pro-
pelled howitzers, twelve 120 mm 2B16 Nona-K towed howitzers; general 
military battalions with a three-company structure);
 – 79th Mechanised Brigade – Gusev (three mechanised battalions, a tank bat-
talion, two self-propelled artillery squadrons, one missile artillery squad-
ron, one anti-tank artillery squadron; forty-one T-72B tanks, 159 MT-LB ar-
moured personnel carriers, eleven BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, 
thirty-six 152 mm 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers, eighteen 120 mm 
2S12 Sani mortars, twelve 122 mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 
twelve 100 mm MT-12 Rapira anti-tank cannons; general military battal-
ions with four-company structure);
 – 244th Artillery Brigade – Kaliningrad (one self-propelled artillery squad-
ron, one missile artillery squadron; eighteen 152 mm 2A36 Giatsint-B towed 
howitzers, eighteen 122 mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers);
 – 152nd Missile Brigade – Chernyakhovsk (three missile squadrons, twelve	
9K723	Iskander-M	rocket	launchers);
 – 22nd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Kaliningrad (four missile batteries, 























Units directly reporting to the Baltic Fleet command:
 – 69th Engineer Regiment – Gvardeysk;
 – 254th Spetsnaz Radio-Engineering Battalion – Gvardeysk;
 – 134th Communication Battalion – Kaliningrad;
 – 135th Communication Battalion – Kaliningrad;
 – 2574th Weapons and Ammunition Base – Guryevsk/Ryabinovka (the	crea-
tion	of	a	mechanised	regiment	is	likely);
 – 2676th Weapons and Ammunition Base – Cherepanovo (the	 creation	 of	
a	mechanised	regiment	is	likely);
 – 2652nd Artillery Weapons and Ammunition Base – Prokhladnoye (the	crea-
tion	of	an	artillery	regiment	is	likely);
 – 148th Repair and Construction Battalion – Kaliningrad.
The contingent of Aerospace Forces reporting to the Baltic Fleet command
44th	Anti-Aircraft	Division	–	Kaliningrad	–	consisting	of:
 – 183rd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Gvardeysk (five missile squadrons; 
thirty-two	S-400	missile	systems, six 96K6 Pantsir-S1 systems);
 – 1545th Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Znamensk (three missile squad-
rons; eight	S-400	missile	systems, sixteen S-300W systems); a	second	mis-
sile	squadron	armed	with	S-400	systems	to	be	formed	in	2019;
 – 81st Radio-Engineering Regiment – Pereslavskoye.
Units directly reporting to the Baltic Fleet command:
 – 132nd Mixed Aviation Division – Kaliningrad – consisting of:
–	 4th	 Separate	Naval	 Attack	 Aviation	 Regiment	 –	 Chkalovsk (one bomber-























sixteen Su-24M/Su-24MR bomber and tactical reconnaissance aircraft, 
eight	Su-30M2	multirole	combat	aircraft,	eight	Su-30SM	multirole	combat	
aircraft);
–	 689th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	–	Chkalovsk	(two fighter squadrons; four-
teen Su-27/Su-27P/Su-27UP/Su-27UB fighter aircraft, thirteen	 Su-27SM3	
multirole	fighter	aircraft);
 – transport squadron of the 72nd Air Base (undergoing transformation, a heli-
copter regiment of the 132nd Mixed Air Division being formed) – Khrabrovo 
(twelve Mi-24 combat helicopters, eight Mi-8 combat support helicopters, 
three An-26 transport aircraft, two An-140-100 transport aircraft);
 – 81st Communication and Radio-Engineering Battalion – Primorsk/Lunino;























Appendix 5. Expected expansion of general military and support units at bat-
talion/squadron level and their offensive weapons (basic categories as per the 
CFE Treaty) following the creation of a mechanised division in the Kaliningrad 
Oblast
december 2016 February 2019 2021 (forecast)
Number of general military and support units in the 
11th Army Corps and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade
Tank battalion 1/1* 3/1* 8
Mechanised battalion 6 6 13
Naval infantry battalion 2 2 2
Landing and assault 
battalion
1 1 1
Artillery squadron 8 8 13
Number of offensive weapons (basic categories as per CFE Treaty)




Artillery with calibre of 
100 mm and higher
144 144 234
* tank battalion of the 7th Mechanised Regiment existing as a cadre structure without weapons
